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In response to the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Cen-
ter on September 11, 2001, the United States Congress passed a joint
resolution authorizing President Bush "to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he de-
termines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist at-
tacks."' As the "War on Terrorism" moves on with still no end in sight,
one wonders: Who has the power to end the War on Terrorism?'
This question is important because the existence of a state of war
affects both domestic and international law. Domestically, the exis-
tence of a state of war has a major impact on civil liberties. The power
of the federal government, and its ability to restrict civil liberties, in-
creases during war.' This principle has been recognized by the Su-
preme Court4 and is rooted in the text of the Constitution. The Bill of
Rights contains two provisions, the Third and Fifth Amendments, that
explicitly reduce the protection of individual rights during "time of
war."' Additionally, the legality of military tribunals, such as those
proposed for use during the War on Terrorism, depends on the exis-
tence of a state of war.
t A.B. 1997; J.D. Candidate 2004, The University of Chicago.
I Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224,224 (2001).
2 This Comment does not examine the constitutional validity of a declaration of war
against "persons" or "organizations." It considers only the power to end wars properly author-
ized.
3 Chief Justice Rehnquist recently noted that "[i]t is neither desirable nor is it remotely
likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in peacetime." Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 224-25 (Knopf 1998).
4 See Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214, 216, 223 (1944) (upholding a "legal restric-
tion[] which curtail[s] the civil rights of a single racial group" during World War II). Some argue
that the Court has gone astray in cases like Korematsu when applying the principle of reduced
protection of individual rights during war. See, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties at
Risk Again: A US. Tradition, Chi Trib C1 (Feb 16,2003). Nonetheless, improper application of the
principle in cases like Korematsu does not necessarily invalidate the constitutionality of the prin-
ciple, especially since the principle can be traced to the text of the Constitution. See note 5 and
accompanying text.
5 See US Const Amend III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.");
US Const Amend V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.").
6 See In re Yamashita, 327 US 1, 11-12 (1946) (holding that the President's power to try
and punish "enemy combatants who have committed violations of the law of war ... is without
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Numerous statutes impact war-time civil liberties. Statutes such as
the Alien Enemy Act7 give the President increased powers during
times of war.' Since Congress could simply repeal each individual war-
time statute, the expiration of these statutes does not depend solely on
the end of the domestic state of war. However, the existence of a state
of war importantly affects application of these war-time statutes.
Many of these statutes contain provisions that explicitly state that the
powers granted to the President expire at the end of the state of war.
And because these statutes grant powers that are thought necessary
for waging war successfully, Congress is unlikely to repeal them before
a war has ended. Thus, ending the domestic state of war is important
with respect to war-time legislation despite the fact that Congress
could repeal these statutes.
The United States is also affected by the existence of a state of
war under international law. The existence of a state of war affects a
nation's ability to occupy the territory of an enemy state. The state of
war impacts the rights and duties of other nations by implicating the
laws of neutrality.' Additionally, a declaration of peace that ends the
legal state of war arguably triggers the obligation to release enemy
combatants, such as those held in Guantanamo Bay, earlier than if no
formal steps were taken to end the state of war."
The states of war created under domestic and international law
do not necessarily end at the same time or in the same manner. Thus,
any discussion of declaring peace must distinguish between ending
war for domestic or international purposes. This Comment primarily
focuses on declaring peace under domestic law for two reasons. First,
it is domestic law, namely the Constitution, to which one must look in
order to determine which branch of the United States government is
authorized to act. Second, understanding when the domestic state of
qualification ... so long as a state of war exists").
7 50 USC § 21 (2000) (allowing war-time seizure of enemy aliens).
8 For a partial listing of statutes expanding executive power during war, see John C. Yoo,
War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U Chi L Rev 1639, 1673 n 101 (2002).
9 See Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human
Rights, 8 Israel Yearbook Hum Rts 104, 105 (1978) (noting that the occupation of enemy terri-
tory terminates when the occupying country withdraws its forces or upon the end of the war).
10 For an account of the continuing importance of the laws of neutrality, see Detlev F.
Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a Changing Environment, 14 Am U Intl L
Rev 83, 88-89 (1998) ("In the post-World War II epoch the status of neutrality has significantly
changed. Some believed that neutrality would disappear.... The idea of neutrality's total disap-
pearance, however, is an exaggeration.").
II Under the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war must be released upon the "cessation
of active hostilities." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art 118,
1955 6 UST 3316,3406,TIAS No 3364 (1949). Without a formal declaration ending the legal state
of war, it will be difficult to determine when this occurs in the War on Terrorism. However, a
pronouncement that the legal state of war is over would immediately create the obligation to re-
patriate.
[70:16091610
The Power to Declare Peace Unilaterally
war terminates goes a long way in determining whether the interna-
tional state of war has ended, since many of the methods to be consid-
ered for ending war domestically will also serve to end war under in-
ternational law.
Whom, then, does the Constitution authorize to end the War on
Terrorism? Answering this question requires knowing where the Con-
stitution places the power to declare peace. Unfortunately, the Consti-
tution makes no mention of the power to declare peace, and the de-
bates of the Constitutional Convention demonstrate that the Framers
expected war to end by peace treaty. Because negotiating a peace
treaty in the War on Terrorism is unlikely, the original understanding
of the power to declare peace cannot determine how the United
States can end the war."
To answer that question, historical precedents are useful. For ex-
ample, following World War II, no peace treaty was negotiated with
Germany. Instead, peace was restored by joint presidential and con-
gressional action. '3 Thus, historical practice lends strong support to the
idea that the President and Congress can work together to end the
War on Terrorism. However, in the absence of joint action, whether ei-
ther the President or Congress could act unilaterally to end the legal
state of war remains unsettled.4
The Framers vested the whole of the war powers in the Congress
and President, yet only a few powers were explicitly allocated to ei-
ther branch. Since the power to declare peace is not one of the enu-
merated powers, the constitutional text does not explicitly determine
whether either of the branches of the government has the authority to
act alone to make peace. Does the President's role as Commander-in-
Chief and "sole organ""' of foreign affairs give him the power to de-
clare peace? If so, he could act against the will of Congress to restore
peace. Does Congress's power to declare war " imply that the power to
12 The question of how the United States can terminate war when it cannot negotiate a
peace treaty should not be regarded as unique to the War on Terrorism. Changes in international
law made by the United Nations Charter have made peace treaties exceedingly rare. See Yoram
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 34 (Cambridge 3d ed 2001) ("In the international
armed conflicts of the post-World War ii era, States commonly try to avoid not only the term
'war' but also its corollary 'treaty of peace'.").
13 Seeid at 46 n 121.
14 The President would be attempting to act unilaterally if he announced the end of the le-
gal state of war without congressional approval, while Congress would be attempting to act uni-
laterally if it overrode a presidential veto on a joint resolution announcing the end of the legal
state of war.
15 See United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304,319 (1936) ("The President
is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign na-
tions.").
16 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11. Congress's failure to pass a formal declaration of war in the
War on Terrorism is not important, since it authorized the use of military force, and these two
congressional actions are equivalent. See John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional
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declare peace is legislative? If so, Congress could declare peace over
the objections of the President by overriding his veto. Does the Fram-
ers' expectation that peace would be made by treaty, and the fact that
a treaty cannot be made without the President, imply that peace re-
quires the President's concurrence? This would lead to the conclusion
that Congress could not declare peace by overriding a presidential
veto.
Many scholars argue that Congress can act unilaterally and de-
clare peace by joint resolution. On this reading, the War on Terrorism
could come to a legal end, against the wishes of the President, if two-
thirds of both the House and Senate overrode a presidential veto to
pass a joint resolution declaring peace. Some of these scholars assert
that the Constitution creates a congressional power to declare peace
either by implication from Congress's power to declare war or its
power to repeal legislation;" others argue that Supreme Court deci-
sions establish a congressional peace power; " and some claim that
Congress established its ability to declare peace by doing so in the
past."
This Comment argues that the case for a congressional power to
declare peace unilaterally is not sustained on any of these grounds.
This Comment further argues that legal precedent and sound public
policy support a unilateral presidential power to declare peace. Part I
presents the Framers' understanding of the power to declare peace
and examines the case law dealing with the peace power. Part II ar-
gues against a congressional power to declare peace by joint resolu-
tion. Part III argues that a presidential power to declare peace unilat-
erally is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, and that the
circumstances of the War on Terrorism strengthen the functional ar-
guments favoring a unilateral presidential peace power. This Com-
ment concludes that the state of war cannot end against the wishes of
the President since his approval is needed for a peace treaty, joint
Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath 3 (Princeton 1993) (explaining that, according to the origi-
nal understanding of the power to declare war, Congress could exercise its power through legis-
lative authorization) Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 76 (Ox-
ford 2d ed 1996).
17 For the definitive statement of the power to make peace through congressional resolu-
tion, see Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 76 (cited in note 16). Pro-
fessor Henkin acknowledges that the congressional power to make peace was not generally ac-
cepted following World War 1, but concludes that "the power to end the state of war by resolu-
tion is now well established." Id at 371 n 66. For an opposing view, see John C. Yoo, The Con-
tinuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal L Rev
167, 268-69 (1996) (arguing that the Framers "believed that a decision as significant as peace
could not be made without [the President's] consent").
' See Parts ll.A.1 and Il.A.2.
"9 See Part II.A.3.
2(1 See Part II.A.4.
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congressional-executive agreement, and unilateral presidential proc-
lamation.
I. THE POWER TO DECLARE PEACE
The Framers envisioned that the President would play a vital role
in the peace process, and thus rejected several measures that would
have given Congress unilateral power to declare peace. The Supreme
Court initially adopted the Framers' view that peace could be
-achieved only through treaty. While the Court has moved away from
this position, it has not departed from the Framers' belief that the
President must be involved in the peace process.
This Part examines the power to declare peace. Part L.A reviews
the debates of the Constitutional Convention and concludes that the
Framers expected the President to be involved in making peace. Part
I.B examines the Supreme Court decisions addressing the power to
terminate the legal state of war and concludes that the President's ap-
proval is needed to declare peace.
A. Original Understanding of the Peace Power
The text of the Constitution makes no mention of the power to
declare peace.2' However, the debates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion reveal that the Framers rejected a congressional power to declare
peace and expected peace to occur through the negotiation of a peace
treaty.2
Several important inferences can be drawn from the Framers' ex-
pectation that peace would be made by treaty. We can infer that the
Framers intended to foreclose unilateral presidential action, because a
treaty requires the concurrence of the President and two-thirds of the
Senate. On the other hand, while the President's veto power over leg-
islation is subject to congressional override, his treaty power is abso-
lute: No treaty can be made without the President's agreement. Fur-
thermore, the ability to make peace by congressional resolution is
questionable as a matter of original intent because it creates a role for
the House that does not exist in the treaty process.
21 The absence of a peace power is surprising considering that this power was included in
the Articles of Confederation, which granted the Continental Congress the "sole and exclusive
right and power of determining on peace and war." Articles of Confederation Art IX (1777). Be-
cause the Continental Congress was the only branch of the national government, vesting the
peace power in the Continental Congress was necessary, not to show that the power was legisla-
tive. but to exclude the power from the states.
22 See Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1173 at 98
(Little, Brown 3d ed 1858) (explaining that a congressional power to make peace was unani-
mously rejected at the Convention in favor of making peace through treaty).
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At the Constitutional Convention, an amendment was proposed
to grant Congress the power to declare peace]" Pierce Butler offered it
in order "to give the Legislature the power of peace, as they were to
have that of war.' '14 The belief that the power to begin and end war
should reside in the same body was common at the time of the Con-
vention," and was supported by Blackstone. Despite the contempo-
raneous view that these powers should reside in the same hands, this
proposal was unanimously rejected.7 Though the records of the debate
are brief, the reasons given are significant. According to Oliver Ells-
worth, "[t]here is a material difference between the cases of making
war and making peace. It should be easier to get out of war, than in to
it. War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended with in-
tricate and secret negotiations."'" George Mason added that "[h]e was
for clogging, rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace.""
When the Framers decided to include the President in the treaty-
making process, they reiterated the importance of negotiating treaties
in secrecy. A proposal requiring two-thirds consent of both the Senate
and House of Representatives was rejected out of concern for secrecy.
As Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued, "the necessity of secrecy in
the case of treaties forbade a reference of them to the whole Legisla-
ture." '
Madison's concern about the effect that the changes to the treaty
power would have on the peace process led him to propose two peace
treaty exceptions to the general treaty power. His first proposal would
have required only a majority vote from the Senate to consent to a
peace treaty." The second proposal would have "authorize[d] a con-
23 See James Madison,Journal of the Federal Convention 549 (Scott, Foresman 1898) (E.H.
Scott, ed).
24 Id.
25 See, for example, id at 548 (noting that, in the debate over the power to declare war,
Charles Pinckney thought that "[ilt would be singular for one authority to make war, and an-
other peace").
26 See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England *250 ("[W]her.ever the
right resides of beginning a national war, there also must reside the right of ending it, or the
power of making peace.").
27 See Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention at 549 (cited in note 23).
28 ld at 548. While it would be easy to read the need for "intricate and secret negotiation"
as a basis for preferring the President over Congress in determining peace, it is important to note
that at the time that this statement was made, the treaty power lay solely with the Senate. The
relative ease with which peace would result was based on the fact that treaties required only a
majority vote in the Senate, while war required a majority in both the House and Senate. The re-
structuring of the treaty power to authorize the President to make treaties with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate clearly promoted the aim of facilitating negotiations, but it
apparently did so at the expense of the other justification for leaving the power to declare peace
as part of the treaty power-that making peace should be easier than making war.
29 Id.
30 Id at 680.
31 See id at 682.
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currence of two-thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace, without
the concurrence of the President." 2 The combined effect of these two
proposals would have been to make it easier to declare peace than
33
war.
If the Framers' primary goal had been simply to facilitate peace,
they would have adopted Madison's amendments. However, the pro-
posals were rejected on grounds that support the President's primacy
in the peace process." Not only did the President have an advantage in
his ability to negotiate in secrecy, but, unlike the Senate which repre-
sented the interests of the states, he alone represented the whole na-
tion. This argument was presented by Gouverneur Morris, who argued
"that no peace ought to be made without the concurrence of the
President, who was the general guardian of the national interests."'
The Framers rejected Madison's proposals because they believed that
the President should play an important role in the treaty process, de-
spite the fact that the proposals would have made it easier to declare
peace than to declare war.
Madison did not trust the President to protect the national inter-
ests. He thought that the President "would necessarily derive so much
power and importance from a state of war, that he might be tempted,
if authorized, to impede a treaty of peace."' Other Framers shared this
concern, but their fears were assuaged by the fact that Congress had
other checks on the President's ability to wage war. Nathaniel Gor-
ham argued that Madison's proposal to allow the Senate to declare
peace without the President was not necessary since "the means of
carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President, but of
the Legislature."'7
From the text of the Constitution, it is evident that the Framers
envisioned that Congress would check the President's war-making
power through its "power of the purse." The Constitution gives Con-
gress the power "[t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation
32 Id.
33 Under Madison's proposals, the power to declare peace would track the power to de-
clare war, but peace would be easier in all cases as a result of the exclusion of the House of Rep-
resentatives. A declaration of war, like any other act of Congress, would require a majority of
both the House and Senate and the consent of the President; or, if the President's concurrence
was lacking, then the declaration would require two-thirds of both the House and Senate to
override the veto. The Madison proposals would require the concurrence of the President and a
simple majority of the Senate, while allowing the Senate to override the President's objections by
a two-thirds vote.
34 See id at 683, 686 (reporting that the first proposal was initially accepted, but then
dropped the next day, while the second proposal was rejected on its only vote).
35 See id at 682.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two years."'M By
limiting appropriations to two years, the length of a term in the House,
the Framers increased the popular check placed on the war-making
power. Representatives cannot vote to fund the war longer than their
next term, thus assuring that the issue of whether to continue funding
the war will be an issue in their reelection campaigns. Congress's abil-
ity to check the President through its appropriations power was im-
portant to the Framers: It reduced the likelihood that the President
would abuse the fact that peace could not be made without his con-
sent.
B. Case Law Addressing the Power to Declare Peace
The Supreme Court's most recent statement on the power to
terminate war was made in Hamilton v Kentucky Distilleries & Ware-
house Co:9 The "technical state of war [is] terminable only with the
ratification of a treaty of peace or a proclamation of peace."" Cases
prior to Hamilton show that the Court originally adopted the Framers'
view that peace could occur only by treaty. Problems arising after
World War I led the Supreme Court in Hamilton to add proclamations
of peace as an additional method by which wars could be terminated.
More recent cases do not affect the view set forth in Hamilton.
1. Cases prior to Hamilton.
In 1796, the Supreme Court adopted the Framers' view that
peace should occur through the treaty process. In Ware v Hylton,4' Jus-
tice Chase announced that "[a] war between two nations can only be
concluded by treaty."2 This holding was tested at the conclusion of the
Civil War; a war to suppress an insurrection could not be properly
concluded by treaty because the enemy, once defeated, remained part
of the country.
The post-Civil War Supreme Court recognized this problem and
announced a different method for ending domestic war. In United
States v Anderson," the Court accepted the existing law that a peace
treaty was required in a foreign war, but held that "in a domestic war,
like the late one, some public proclamation or legislation would seem
to be required to inform those whose private rights were affected by
38 US Const Art 1, § 8, cl 12.
39 251 US 146 (1919).
40 Id at 161.
41 3 US (3 Dall) 199 (1796).
42 ld at 236.
43 76 US (9 Wall) 56 (1869).
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it, of the time when it terminated."" The Court stated that, in order to
determine the end of the Civil War, "it is only necessary to notice the
proclamation of the President, of August 20th, 1866, and the act of
Congress of the 2d of March, 1867."'"
Two years later, the Court again applied its rule for ending do-
mestic war in The Protector." The Court stated that it was necessary
"to refer to some public act of the political departments of the gov-
ernment to fix the dates; and, for obvious reasons, those of the execu-
tive department, which may be, and, in fact, was, at the commence-
ment of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress, must
be taken." The Court then pointed to two presidential proclamations
"declaring that the war had closed."4'
The Civil War ended through presidential proclamation; however,
the Court explicitly stated that this method was only available in do-
mestic wars."3 Following the Spanish-American War, the Court, in J.
Ribas y Hijo v United States,"' revisited the issue and reaffirmed its
prior holding, refusing to extend the option of peace by proclamation
to foreign wars. President McKinley issued a proclamation ending
hostilities in August 1898, and a treaty of peace was concluded in April
1899.' Ribas, a Spanish corporation whose ship was seized by the
United States military and held until the conclusion of the peace
treaty, sought to "recover on a quantum meruit the value of the use of
the vessel between [the presidential proclamation and peace treaty]."'2
The Court did not allow recovery since "[a] state of war did not in law
cease until the ratification in April, 1899, of the treaty of peace.""3
Thus, by denying recovery, the Court refused to recognize that a
presidential proclamation, in the absence of a peace treaty, could end
a foreign war. Instead, the Court reinforced the distinction between
domestic and foreign wars that it had drawn in Anderson and The
Protector.
2. Hamilton v Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.
The events surrounding the end of World War I made it difficult
for the courts to determine when the state of war had terminated. Fol-
lowing the conclusion of hostilities, the United States signed the
44 Id at 70.
45 Id.
46 79 US (12 Wall) 700 (1871).
47 Id at 702.
Id.
49 See Anderson, 76 US (9 Wall) at 70.
50 194 US 315 (1904).
51 See id at 317.
52 Id.
53 ldat323.
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Treaty of Versailles and President Wilson, attempting to end the legal
state of war with Germany, submitted the treaty to the Senate for its
advice and consent." Wilson, although concerned that the treaty might
not receive the Senate's consent, denied having the power to end the
war by presidential proclamation." The Senate finally voted on, but re-
jected, the treaty,' returning it to the President without consent, which
meant that it could not be ratified." Congress attempted to end the
war by passing a joint resolution, but the House failed to override
President Wilson's veto. Congress later passed a peace resolution that
was signed by President Harding." Peace treaties were 'then negoti-
ated with each enemy,"' and upon ratification of those treaties, Hard-
ing issued a presidential proclamation declaring peace."
In Hamilton, the Supreme Court was forced to interpret the War-
Time Prohibition Act, 2 which made it unlawful to sell "distilled spir-
its" prior to "the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the
termination of demobilization."' The respondent, the owner of a liq-
uor warehouse, brought an action seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the Act. While considering the validity of the Act, the Court twice
addressed the issue of when the legal state of war ended. The Court
first noted that the "technical state of war [was] terminable only with
the ratification of a treaty of peace or a proclamation of peace."'M
Later in the opinion, the Court stated that "the period of war has been
held to extend to the ratification of the treaty of peace or the procla-
mation of peace."': In both instances, the Court recognized a treaty of
peace and a proclamation of peace as the only methods for ending a
state of war.
54 See Manley 0. Hudson, The Duration of the War between the United States and Ger-
many, 39 Harv L Rev 1020, 1031 (1926).
55 See Statement of President Wilson, 66th Cong, 1st Sess, in 58 Cong Rec S 4177 (Aug 22,
1919) ("I feel constrained to say ... not only that in my judgment I have not the power by proc-
lamation to declare that peace exists, but that I could in no circumstances consent to take such a
course prior to the ratification of a formal treaty of peace.").
56 See Hamilton, 251 US at 160.
57 See Hudson, 39 Harv L Rev at 1031 n 40 (cited in note 54).
58 See id at 1033.
59 See Declaration Terminating War with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Pub Res No 67-8,
42 Stat 105 (1921).
6) See Treaty of Peace between the United States and Germany, 42 Stat 1939, Treaty Ser
No 658 (1921); Treaty of Peace between the United States and Austria, 42 Stat 1946, Treaty Ser
No 659 (1921);Treaty of Peace between the United States and Hungary, 42 Stat 1951,Treaty Ser
No 660 (1921).
61 See Presidential Proclamation Declaring Peace with Germany, 42 Stat 1944 (1921).
62 Pub L No 65-243,40 Stat 1045 (1918).
63 Id at 1046.
64 Hamilton, 251 US at 161.
65 Idat 165.
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The Court cited J. Ribas y Hijo, The Protector, and Anderson to
support its claim that the state of war could end only by peace treaty
or proclamation of peace. These cases provide support for the
Court's claim insofar as J. Ribas y Hijo recognized a peace treaty as
ending the state of war, and The Protector and Anderson recognized
presidential proclamations of peace as ending the state of war. In
adopting this rule, the Court glossed over the post-Civil War distinc-
tion between ending domestic and foreign wars. A presidential proc-
lamation of peace that had been recognized as ending the Civil War
was now cited to support the proposition that a proclamation of peace
could end a foreign war.
The timing of the Hamilton decision could have played a role in
the Court's addition of "proclamation of peace" as a method of ending
foreign wars. When the Court was deciding Hamilton, the possibility
that a peace treaty would not be concluded was no longer purely hy-
pothetical. The Senate had voted against ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles on November 19, 1919." The Court heard arguments in
Hamilton the next day, November 20, and issued its opinion less than a
month later on December 15, 1919. ' As a result of the Senate's failure
to consent to the Treaty of Versailles, the Court may have realized that
if it allowed only a peace treaty to end the legal state of war, the war
might never end.
The Court did not explicitly state that a proclamation of peace
must come from the President. However, it is unlikely that the Court
thought that a congressional resolution could serve as a proclamation
of peace. Each of the Civil War cases to which the Court cited for the
proposition that war can end by proclamation of peace explicitly re-
fers to proclamations of peace made by the President.6 Additionally,
Anderson distinguishes between a "public proclamation and legisla-
tion."' Finally, a number of war-time statutes discussed by the Court
clearly stated that the proclamation of peace was to be made by the
President.' These factors make it unlikely that the Court would intend
the phrase "proclamation of peace" to be interpreted so broadly as to
include congressional resolutions without explicitly saying as much.
Thus, when the Court recognized that a proclamation of peace could
end war, it was recognizing a presidential power to proclaim peace.
66 Id.
67 Id at 160.
68 Id at 146.
69 See text accompanying notes 43-48.
711 Anderson, 76 US at 70.
71 See Hamilton, 251 US at 165 n 1 (listing statutes that expire at the end of the war, a
number of which explicitly mention a "proclamation by the President").
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The Court not only failed to include congressional resolution as a
method of declaring peace in a foreign war, but it excluded this
method by making treaty and proclamation the only methods. The cir-
cumstances under which the Court decided this case are once again
important. Permitting a congressional resolution to end the war, when
a treaty has been negotiated and needs only Senate approval, would
effectively allow the Senate to choose the House over the President as
its partner in the peace process. If there was strong opposition in the
Senate to a peace treaty negotiated by the President, as was the case
with the Treaty of Versailles, the Senate might prefer passing a resolu-
tion instead of acting upon the treaty. The Court may have worried
that permitting congressional resolutions to be used to declare peace
would facilitate an end-run around the traditional peace process.
Allowing the President to declare peace by proclamation could,
as a general matter, result in the President attempting an end-run
around the traditional peace process by issuing a proclamation instead
of negotiating a treaty. However, the Court was not faced with this dif-
ficulty in Hamilton. It did not have to worry about this possibility be-
cause the President had already performed his traditional role by ne-
gotiating the treaty and submitting it to the Senate for its advice and
consent.
3. Cases following Hamilton.
On November 14, 1921, upon ratification of the peace treaty,
President Harding issued a presidential proclamation stating that the
legal state of war with Germany had concluded four months earlier on
July 2 of that year. 2 Under the rule set forth in Hamilton, this action
should have been considered sufficient to end the war. In Miller v
Rouse," Judge Learned Hand heard an Alien Property Custodian
claim for a demand served on July 5, 1921. Judge Hand denied the
claim because it was made "three days after the declaration of peace
as now promulgated by the President's recent proclamation."7 Thus,
consistent with Hamilton, Judge Hand took the presidential proclama-
tion of peace as setting the date of the end of the legal state of war.
Two years after Harding's presidential proclamation, in Commer-
cial Trust Co v Miller," the Supreme Court was faced with determining
whether the Trading with the Enemy Act"6 was still valid. This case has
been relied upon for establishing a congressional power to declare
72 See Proclamation Declaring Peace with Germany, 42 Stat 1944.
73 276 F715 (SD NY 1921).
74 Id at 716.
75 262 US 51 (1923).
76 Pub L No 65-91, 40 Stat 411 (1917), codified in various sections of 50 USC App (2000).
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peace. In it, the Court stated that "the power which declared the ne-
cessity is the power to declare its cessation, and what the cessation re-
quires. The power is legislative."" Read out of context, this statement
appears to grant Congress the power to declare peace. When placed
into context, however, it is clear that the Court was simply referring to
the power to determine whether the Trading with the Enemy Act
should remain in effect.
The Court's statement responded to an argument claiming that
the statute was no longer valid because the war was over." Congress
has the power to determine the necessity of war-time legislation; the
Court determined that it was unfit to determine when this necessity
no longer existed, so it looked to Congress for this determination."
Congress had passed a resolution terminating many of its war-time
statutes, but had excluded the Trading with the Enemy Act. Based on
this congressional action, the Court determined that the legislative in-
tent was to keep the Act in force. In concluding that the statute was
valid, the Court did not need to address the power to end the state of
war.
Following World War II, the Court was once again faced with de-
termining when war-time statutes expired. In Ludecke v Watkins,"' the
Court addressed the question whether the Alien Enemy Act of 1798"
had expired. This statute authorized the President to remove aliens
from the United States during "declared war."' The Court was not
faced with the constitutional question of whether the state of war had
ended, but with a question of statutory interpretation: whether the
"declared war," as defined by the statute, had ended.
The Court examined the legislative history of the Act and deter-
mined that there was no reason to believe that Congress intended the
Act to expire prior to the end of the legal state of war." The Court also
noted that it was clear that the state of war had not ended. Since the
state of war had not ended, and the Court had interpreted the statute
to remain in effect until the termination of the state of war, the Court
77 Commercial Trust, 262 US at 57.
78 Id.
79 The Court said:
A court cannot estimate the effects of a great war and pronounce their termination at a
particular moment of time, and that its consequences are so far swallowed up that
legislation addressed to its emergency had ceased to have purpose or operation with the
cessation of the conflicts in the field.
Id.
8 335 US 160 (1948).
81 1 Stat 577 (1798), codified as amended at 50 USC § 21 (2000).
82 Id.
83 See Ludecke, 335 US at 166 n 11.
Id at 169.
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concluded that the statute was still in effect. As a result, the Court had
no need to consider how the state of war could end.
Although the Court was simply interpreting the Alien Enemy
Act, some commentators have relied on language from this opinion to
argue that Ludecke, not Hamilton, states the Court's view on the
power to declare peace.'5 In Ludecke, the Court, during a discussion of
whether the President's statutory power had expired, noted that
"'[tihe state of war' may be terminated by treaty or legislation or
Presidential proclamation. Whatever the mode, its termination is a po-
litical act.""
This statement should be read as referring to the means of termi-
nating the "state of war" with respect to the Act, not of terminating
the legal state of war. This reading is proper in light of the fact that the
Court made this statement while interpreting the statute and because
the rest of the Court's discussion on the power to end the legal state of
war not only makes no attempt to depart from, but is consistent with,
Hamilton.
The Court's discussion of whether the war with Germany had
ended is important to note. Justice Frankfurter, quoting a presidential
proclamation, wrote: "The political branch of the Government has not
brought the war with Germany to an end. On the contrary, it has pro-
claimed that 'a state of war still exists.""' . No treaty had been con-
cluded, so Frankfurter looked to the presidential proclamation to de-
termine whether peace had been restored. This analysis is exactly in
line with Hamilton and in no way suggests that the Court was attempt-
ing to change the power to restore peace.
The Court's footnote to the statement "'the state of war' may be
terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential proclamation"'' also
suggests that the Court was listing the methods by which the statute,
not the war, could be terminated. Congress, according to the Court,
could "provide either by a day certain or a defined event for the expi-
ration of a statute. But when the life of a statute is defined by the exis-
tence of a war, Congress leaves the determination of when a war is
concluded to the usual political agencies of the Government."" Con-
gress can determine when a statute expires; the usual political agen-
85 See Part II.A.3.
86 335 US at 168-69.
87 Id at 170, quoting Presidential Proclamation 2714,3 CFR §§ 99-100 (1957).
88 Ludecke, 335 US at 168. The Court's placement of the term "state of war" within quota-
Iion marks is interesting. The reference to "the state of war" in the same paragraph (just three
sentences later), id at 169, without quotation marks makes their initial use even more intriguing.
One possible explanation is that the quotation marks are used to distinguish between the state of
war for purposes of the statute and the state of war in its technical sense. When the phrase is
used without quotes it seems that the Court is referring to war in the technical sense.
89 Id at 169n 13.
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cies, the President or the President and Senate, can end war through
presidential proclamation or peace treaty, respectively. Thus, "the state
of war" within the meaning of the statute can be ended by peace
treaty, legislation, or presidential proclamation.
The reference to the usual political agencies in this footnote
shows that the Court limited the making of peace to those methods al-
ready recognized, and did not attempt to set a new standard. After
Hamilton, it was clear who the "usual political agencies" were: the
President or the President and Senate.
The Ludecke Court did not create a new method for terminating
foreign wars. The Court did nothing more than determine whether the
Act had expired. Thus, the standard announced by the Court in Ham-
ilton-that the "technical state of war [is] terminable only with the
ratification of a treaty of peace or a proclamation of peace""-
remains the Court's current statement of the methods of terminating
the state of war.
II. DECLARING PEACE BY CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION
The case law suggests that war can end only by treaty or presi-
dential proclamation. This view follows the Framers' original under-
standing that the President would be involved in negotiating peace.
Nevertheless, many commentators have argued that Congress pos-
sesses the power to declare peace. Part II.A analyzes, and ultimately
rejects, arguments that Congress possesses the power to declare peace
through a joint resolution. The next question is whether Congress
should be able to override a presidential veto and end the legal state
of war. Part II.B examines a number of arguments that favor recogniz-
ing a congressional power to declare peace and finds none of them
convincing.
A. Arguments Claiming Congress Has the Power to Declare Peace
In Hamilton, the Supreme Court asserted that war can only be
terminated by peace treaty or proclamation of peace, seemingly pre-
cluding the termination of the legal state of war by congressional reso-
lution. Commentators have nonetheless advanced a number of differ-
ent arguments claiming that Congress has the power to declare peace.
Four of these arguments are examined below: the power to declare
peace is implicit in Congress's power to declare war; Congress can end
war by repealing its declaration; Supreme Court decisions have cre-
ated a congressional peace power; and Congress has ended wars by
resolution in the past, thus establishing its power to do so. None of
W 251 US at 161.
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these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that Congress has the
power to declare peace.
1. Constitutional authority implicit in power to declare war.
Professor Louis Henkin in his book, Foreign Affairs and the
United States Constitution, argues that "[t]he power 'of determining on
peace and war' surely implies also a corollary power to decide that
war should end."' The difficulty with this argument is that Congress
does not possess the power "of determining on peace and war." This
power does not come from the Constitution; instead, this was the
power possessed by the Continental Congress under the Articles of
Confederation. The Constitution merely grants Congress the power
to "declare War," and it is unclear that the "corollary power to decide
that war should end" derives from this power.
The argument can be based on Congress's constitutional power
to declare war and its receipt of powers "necessary and proper" to
carrying out this enumerated power. Thus, one could argue that the
power to end war is a necessary and proper extension of the power to
declare it. This is the strongest form of the pro-Congress argument,
since it attempts to find congressional authority within the Constitu-
tion itself.
This argument is strengthened by the fact that, at the time of the
Founding, it was generally thought that the power to declare war im-
plied the power to declare peace. Yet the proposed amendment at the
Constitutional Convention to grant Congress the power to "declare
war and peace" makes it clear that the Framers did not think that one
power implied the other." Not only did the Framers not think that this
power was implied, but their rejection of the proposed amendment
displayed a desire to place the two powers in separate bodies. The
Framers' choice of giving Congress the power to declare war and the
treaty-makers the power to declare peace refutes the argument that
one power necessarily implies the other."
The power to declare war does grant Congress considerable
power over war. In Bas v Tingy,'" the Supreme Court recognized that
Congress had the power to limit the scope of war. In Bas, Justice
Chase wrote: "Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or
91 Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 76 (cited in note 16).
92 See Articles of Confederation Art IX (1777).
93 See text accompanying notes 23-27.
" For a district court opinion supporting this argument, see United States v Hicks, 256 F
707.710 (WD Ky 1919) (reasoning that "the Constitution, while in express terms giving Congress
the sole power of declaring war, in no way so expresses itself as to give that body any authority
itself to terminate it").
'6 4 US (4 Dall) 37 (1800).
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congress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in
time. ' '  The "declare War" power, according to Chase, allows for more
than just a "yes or no" determination of whether to commence war; it
allows for Congress to choose the type of war." One might argue that
if Congress has the power to determine the scope of the war, it must
have the power to determine when the war has come to an end.
However, Bas should not be read to grant Congress the power to
terminate war. Justice Chase only recognized the power of Congress
to create limitations while authorizing the war; he did not recognize a
power to restrict the President's authority after hostilities have begun.
There is a considerable difference between the power to place restric-
tions ex ante on the President's ability to wage war and the power to
determine, once the war has started, that it should end. The President's
ability to wage war successfully is not as severely compromised by ex
ante restrictions since he can incorporate those decisions into his war
plans. This power is markedly different than the power being claimed
here-the power to place restrictions directly on the President's abil-
ity to wage war during hostilities.
2. Power to repeal legislation.
According to Professor Edward Corwin, Congress derives the
power to restore peace from its power to repeal legislation.w On this
view, Congress has the power to repeal any piece of legislation that it
passes, so it can repeal its declaration of war (or authorization of the
use of force) and effectively end the war. Any such repeal would be
functionally equivalent to a peace resolution since each would require
a two-thirds majority to override a presidential veto. Since Congress
can achieve the same result through an equivalent piece of legislation,
whether the legislation is called a "declaration of peace" or a "repeal
of war" should not matter.
Congress can repeal any legislation that it passes. However, this
does not imply that it can terminate all that the legislation initiated.
Professor Quincy Wright pointed out that Corwin's argument "fails to
recognize the distinction between an act of legislation and a resolution
creating a status or condition. Congress cannot, in general, repeal
resolutions of the latter class, of which resolutions admitting states to
96 Id at 43. Many scholars recognize this congressional power as well. See Michael D. Ram-
sey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U Chi L Rev 1543, 1620 (2002) ("Congress can exercise some
strategic direction of a war through its declare-war power.").
97 See Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1620 (cited in note 96) ("Congress's decision to declare
war was not a binary choice, involving total war or nothing; rather, Congress was entitled to set
limited goals for the hostilities.").
98 See Edward S. Corwin, The Power of Congress to Declare Peace, 18 Mich L Rev 669,
674-75 (1920).
2003] 1.625
The University of Chicago Law Review
the Union, incorporating territory, admitting nationals to citizenship,
etc., are examples."" Professor John Mathews rejected Corwin's argu-
ment for similar reasons: "Congress can pass an act or joint resolution
admitting a state into the Union, but it would hardly be maintained
that, after a state has once been admitted, Congress could expel it by a
simple repeal of the act admitting it.""' Similarly, the repeal of a decla-
ration of war does not necessarily terminate the state of war created
by that declaration.
3. Supreme Court precedent.
Some scholars have claimed to find a congressional power to de-
clare peace in Supreme Court precedent. Professor Henkin supports
his argument that Congress can declare peace unilaterally by citing
two Supreme Court opinions. In support of his claim that Congress's
power to restore peace is "now well established," Henkin quotes
Commercial Trust: "[T]he power which declared the necessity, is the
power to declare its cessation and what the cessation requires. The
power is legislative."" Reading this quote as referring to war implies
that the Court is recognizing that the power to end war is legislative,
not executive. However, the Court was referring, not to war, but to an
act of Congress."'2 Under this reading, the Court merely stated that the
power to determine when an act of Congress expires is legislative, not
judicial.
Henkin also cites Ludecke for the proposition that "'[t]he State of
War' may be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential proc-
lamation.""' The "state of war" that the Court refers to in Ludecke was
the period of time in which the statute remained in effect." The
quotes taken from Commercial Trust and Ludecke, when read out of
context, can be seen as recognizing a congressional power to declare
peace. However, closer analysis of the opinions shows that the Court
was recognizing no such power."'
4. Historical practice.
The assertion that Congress has the power to declare peace has
also been based on historical practice. Professor Henkin observes that
"[o]rdinarily, wars are ended by treaty, but Congress declared an end
99 Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 292 (MacMillan 1922).
t""i John M. Mathews, The Termination of War, 19 Mich L Rev 819,831 (1921).
101 Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 370-71 n 66 (cited in
note 16).
102 See text accompanying notes 75-79.
103 Ludecke, 335 US at 168.
104 See text accompanying notes 81-91.
105 See Part I.B.3.
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to both World Wars by resolution.""" Congress did issue resolutions
stating that the state of war had ended following each world war;
however, these resolutions do not establish a congressional power to
declare peace unilaterally.
Congress's attempt to end World War I by unilateral declaration
failed. '7 The congressional resolution that was eventually passed
should not be viewed as creating a congressional power to end war by
resolution because its legal effect is not clear. Peace treaties were ne-
gotiated with each enemy. And, upon their ratification, the President
issued a proclamation declaring an end to the state of war. The fact
that the peace treaties and presidential proclamation recognize the
date chosen by Congress as the end of the war displays respect for the
congressional resolution. "" However, it cannot be claimed as historical
precedent for the claim that Congress can declare peace by joint reso-
lution.
World War II also does not provide a historical precedent for es-
tablishing a unilateral congressional power to declare peace. The state
of war with Japan was terminated in the traditional manner-by rati-
fying a peace treaty." No treaty was negotiated with Germany; in-
stead, the legal state of war ended through a presidential proclamation
issued following passage of a joint resolution signed by the Presi-
dent.' ° This event can provide historical precedent for the claim that
joint congressional-executive action can terminate a state of war;
however, it does not provide support for a unilateral congressional
peace power. Consequently, the actions of Congress following the two
world wars do not establish by practice a congressional power to end a
war without the President's agreement.
B. Arguments in Favor of Creating a Congressional Peace Power
A congressional power to declare peace lacks a firm foundation
in existing law. Although Congress does not currently have the power
to declare peace, arguments can be advanced to support a congres-
sional role in terminating war. Since it is possible that the Supreme
Court could be faced with the task of determining when the War on
106 Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 76 (cited in note 16).
107 For a more detailed account, see text accompanying notes 54-61.
108 Judicial opinions determining the end of the war did not look to the congressional reso-
lution for proof that the war had ended. Judge Hand stated in Miller, 276 F at 716, that World
War I ended on the date established by the presidential proclamation issued upon the ratifica-
tion of the peace treaties. See also notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
1(0 Treaty of Peace between the United States and Japan, 1952 3 UST 3169, TIAS No 2490
(1951).
110 See Dinstein, War. Aggression and Self-Defence at 46 n 121 (cited in note 12).
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Terrorism ends, the arguments for recognizing a congressional power
should be examined.
1. Originalist arguments.
Those originalists who favor a congressional peace power can
point to several pieces of evidence supporting their position. First is
the often-quoted remark from the Constitutional Convention that it
"should be more easy to get out of war, than in to it.""' Professor
Corwin relied on this statement to argue that peace should be allowed
in any manner not foreclosed by the Constitution: "[T]here is more
than one road leading to peace, as to Rome, and a sovereign govern-
ment ... has access to them all, unless it can be shown to be cut off
therefrom by some definite constitutional prohibition."'
12
The Framers' desire to facilitate peace, however, does not support
an originalist argument for a congressional peace power. The Framers'
statements, viewed in isolation, can support arguments favoring a con-
gressional power to restore peace. But, the original understanding,
when viewed as a whole, favors the primacy of the President."'
The Framers' primary concern was not to ensure that war was
easier to get out of than in to."' However, even if this statement is
taken as reflective of the Framers' views, whether it favors granting
Congress the power to declare peace is difficult to determine. If Con-
gress possesses the power to declare peace, then peace would be eas-
ier to achieve once a war had begun because there would be more
methods to end the war. However, if Congress did not have the power
to end war, it would be less likely to declare war in the first place. "'
Since granting Congress the power to declare peace makes peace eas-
ier, but withholding the power makes war more difficult, it is unclear
which option has a greater effect on the balance between peace and
war.
Corwin's argument, favoring peace by any method not foreclosed
by the Constitution, is unpersuasive. The Constitution, by creating a
Congress of enumerated powers, makes this argument suspect as a
method of constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, the debates of
the Constitutional Convention show that the Framers rejected meth-
IlI Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention at 548 (cited in note 23).
112 Corwin, 18 Mich L Rev at 675 (cited in note 98).
113 See Part I.A.
114 The rejection of Madison's two proposals shows that the desire for peace being easier
than war was not an overriding concern. See text accompanying notes 31-35.
115 This valuable insight was made by Professor Sidak, who analogized this situation to en-
try and exit from an industry and noted that "[e]conomists recognize that a barrier to exit from
an industry also functions ex ante as a barrier to entry into that industry. The same insight regard-
ing 'reversible entry' applies to constitutional governance." See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War,
41 Duke L J 27,89 (1991).
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ods of making peace that were not explicitly forbidden in the Consti-
tution. Corwin's method of interpretation clearly runs counter to the
original intent.
Some scholars also rely on Madison's writings in response to the
neutrality controversy of 1793 to support their arguments.' 6 Madison
recognized that "the constitution has not permitted the Executive sin-
gly to conclude or judge that peace ought to be made."' 7 Madison
even offered a detailed account of why the person who conducts a war
should not be able to judge when it ends. "It is in war, finally, that lau-
rels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encir-
cle.""... The desire for victory, according to Madison, is so strong that it
cannot be overcome to make a rational decision whether to continue a
war. According to him, "[t]he strongest passions, and most dangerous
weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honor-
able or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and
duty of peace.""' For this reason, Madison argued that "[t]hose who
are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe
judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or con-
cluded..'2" Because the President stands to gain so much by waging
war, he cannot be trusted to decide whether war should end.
Madison's "Helvidius" argument appears unrepresentative of the
beliefs of the majority of the Framers. Madison made a similar argu-
ment at the Constitutional Convention when he proposed allowing a
two-thirds vote by the Senate to make a treaty without presidential
consent. The Framers rejected this proposal, which should make us
wary of claiming this argument as reflective of the original intent. Fur-
thermore, the fact that Madison's argument was not accepted when it
was made renders it an even more questionable interpretation of the
peace power.
116 The neutrality controversy arose following France's declaration of war on Great Britain.
It was arguable that the United States had a treaty obligation to enter the war on France's be-
half, but President Washington issued a proclamation announcing the country's neutrality. Madi-
son and Hamilton famously debated whether the President or Congress had the power to decide
that the United States would remain neutral. For a more complete account of this controversy,
see H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Essay in Constitu-
tional Interpretation 47-51 (Carolina 2002).
117 "Helvidius" No 4 (Madison), in Thomas A. Mason, Robert A. Rutland, and Jeanne K.
Sisson, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison 110 (Virginia 1985).
118 Id at 108.
119 Id.
120 "Helvidius" No 1 (Madison), in Mason, Rutland, and Sisson, eds, 15 Papers of James
Madison at 66,71 (cited in note 117).
121 See Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 115
(Ballinger 1976) ("The theory advocated by Madison in 1793 as to the appropriate roles of
President and Congress had been rejected in practice even before his Helvidius papers saw the
light of day.").
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2. Appropriations power.
Another argument in favor of recognizing a congressional power
to end war is based on the fact that Congress can withhold funding for
a war, bringing the fighting in the war to an end. This power to exer-
cise control over whether military operations continue is distinct from
the power to end the legal state of war. However, since Congress can
bring the fighting to an end, it arguably should be allowed to termi-
nate the state of war as well. Granting Congress this additional power
might seem attractive since withholding military funding is undesir-
able: The reduction of funding would lead, in the period prior to the
end of the war, to less-effective waging of war, putting the lives of
American soldiers in danger. Withholding funding is procedurally eas-
ier than declaring peace over a presidential veto because a simple ma-
jority in either the House or Senate can prevent the necessary appro-
priations bill from being passed. Given that declaring peace requires
broader support than withholding funding, it may be argued that Con-
gress should be granted the power to declare peace so that it can end
war directly.
But the very fact that withholding appropriations can place a
strong check on the President's ability to wage war cuts against the ar-
gument that the appropriations power is a basis for granting Congress
the power to terminate war. It was precisely because the appropria-
tions power would check the President that some of the Framers did
not think it necessary to allow Congress to declare peace.'22 Since the
appropriations power still checks the President's war-making power,
we should not lightly reject the Framers' balancing.
3. Absence of a negotiating partner.
The Supreme Court has recognized a congressional power to pass
legislation in some situations where a treaty is ordinarily required, but
no negotiating partner is available. One could argue that the Court
should do the same for the power to terminate the War on Terrorism
since there is no party with whom the United States could negotiate a
peace treaty.
Professor John Mathews argued in favor of a congressional
power to restore peace by analogizing to its power to acquire new ter-
ritory.'.3 "The usual method of acquiring territory has been by treaty,''.
but "the power of Congress to do so by statute or joint resolution is
recognized as proper where there is no foreign government with
122 See paragraph accompanying note 38.
123 See Mathews, 19 Mich L Rev at 831 (cited in 100).
124 Id.
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which a treaty can appropriately be made."25 Likewise, Congress could
possess the power to restore peace when there is no foreign govern-
ment with which to negotiate.
That Congress should have the power to terminate war because it
has the power to acquire territory is a strong argument. However,
there are good reasons to distinguish between the two situations. Inso-
far as territory is acquired with the intention of granting statehood,
the Court acted reasonably in recognizing this congressional power
since Congress's approval would be needed to make the territory a
state.2 In the context of war termination, no subsequent constitutional
power of Congress is implicated.
Furthermore, the President plays a key role in terminating war
for reasons other than his ability to negotiate in secrecy. Even when
there is no possibility of negotiating a peace treaty, the President's ac-
cess to superior information concerning the war puts him in a better
position than Congress to determine whether the war should end. Be-
cause these concerns are not present in the decision to acquire terri-
tory, it is reasonable to distinguish between acquiring land and termi-
nating war.
The arguments in favor of creating a congressional power to de-
clare peace are not sufficiently compelling to depart from the Court's
view in Hamilton. This conclusion is even more apparent after examin-
ing the advantages of presidential control of war termination, which is
the focus of Part III.
III. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF THE PEACE PROCESS
The Supreme Court has recognized that the state of war can be
terminated by a proclamation of peace, which seems to grant the
President the power to declare peace unilaterally. Recognizing a
presidential power to declare peace unilaterally is proper for three
reasons. First, presidential primacy in terminating the state of war is
consistent with the original understanding and existing case law. Sec-
ond, the President's role as "sole organ" of foreign affairs puts the
President in the best position to announce the nation's decisions.
Third, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has access to superior
information that allows him to make the best decision about whether
the war should end. This Part examines each of these rationales and
shows that these advantages continue to support the President's
power, particularly in an unconventional war like the War on Terror-
ism.
125 id at 832.
126 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 1.
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A. Original Understanding and Supreme Court Precedent
The Framers were aware of the threat posed by placing the peace
power in the hands of a single person. Madison was especially fearful
of giving the President too much power to wage war and proposed
changes to the constitutional distribution of war powers. The Framers
rejected Madison's proposals because they believed the appropria-
tions power provided a sufficient check on the President. ' The Fram-
ers' belief was reasonable. Congress had the power to declare war and
to raise armies, in addition to the appropriations power. By contrast,
the English Parliament possessed only the appropriations power, yet,
as Justice Story noted, "this is found to be abundantly sufficient to
protect the nation against any war against the sense of the nation, or
any serious abuse of the power in modern times.' 2.
The Framers' belief that the President should be involved in the
peace process has been respected by the Court's decisions on the
power to terminate war. The two methods, peace treaty and proclama-
tion of peace, recognized by the Court following World War I both re-
quire presidential involvement. The Supreme Court did nothing to
change this position following World War II, and lower courts have re-
lied on the Court's post-World War I view.'2" One post-World War I
commentator even referred to "looking only to a treaty or formal ex-
ecutive proclamation" as the "traditional test" for determining
whether the legal state of war had ended.
Both the original understanding of the power to terminate war
and existing Supreme Court precedent on the subject support requir-
ing the President's concurrence in ending the War on Terrorism. Over-
turning this precedent and rejecting the original understanding to al-
low Congress to end the War on Terrorism unilaterally is unwarranted
absent the existence of compelling reasons. Compelling reasons do not
exist. Instead, the unique aspects of the War on Terrorism strengthen
the case for presidential involvement.
127 See text accompanying notes 34-37.
128 Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1492 at 362 (cited in note 22).
129 See, for example, The Elqui (ex Selma), 62 F Supp 764, 767 (ED NY 1945) (noting that
the state of war ended upon "the formal signing of a peace treaty or a proclamation by the sov-
ereign that the war has been officially recognized as being at an end"), citing Hamilton, 251 US
146; Citizens Protective League v Byrnes, 64 F Supp 233, 234 (D DC 1946) (stating that "the pe-
riod of war has been held to extend to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace or the Proclamation
of Peace").
130 Case Note, Enemy Alien- Termination of War- Unconditional Surrender, 95 U Pa L
Rev 416, 418 (1947).
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B. "Sole Organ" of Foreign Affairs
United States domestic law recognizes that the President pos-
sesses the exclusive right to speak on behalf of the nation. ' The most
famous statement of this role, by then-Representative John Marshall,
was adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp:'2 "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its ex-
ternal relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.'.'
An incident involving French diplomat Edmond Charles Genet
provides a valuable insight into the original understanding of the abil-
ity of the President and Congress to speak on behalf of the nation.
Genet, thinking that Congress was more sympathetic toward the
plight of the new French Republic, challenged the President's foreign
affairs authority by addressing his commission to Congress instead of
the President."' The commission was returned by Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson, along with the following message:
[The President] being the only channel of communication be-
tween this country and foreign nations, it is from him alone that
foreign nations or their agents are to learn what is or has been
the will of the nation; and whatever he communicates as such,
they have a right, and are bound to consider as the expression of
the nation."'
Congress has passed resolutions expressing its view on matters of for-
eign relations, but its actions are generally not thought to be sufficient
to challenge the President's exclusive power to speak on behalf of the
United States.'
As the chief representative of the United States, the President is
in the best position to announce the nation's decision to terminate
war. A presidential proclamation declaring peace would clearly signal
to the rest of the world that the United States is no longer at war. A
congressional resolution passed over a presidential veto might create
uncertainty among other nations as to whether the United States was
131 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution at 42 (cited in note 16)
("That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has
not been questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy.").
132 299 US 304 (1936).
133 ld at 319.
134 See Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 Yale L J 231,321 (2001).
135 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (Nov 22, 1793), in Paul Leices-
ter Ford, ed, 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 451 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1895).
136 See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale LJ at 320 n 384 (cited in note 134) ("While Congress
is free to pass nonbinding 'sense of the Congress' resolutions about foreign affairs matters and it
may ask the President to convey messages to foreign governments or peoples, it cannot purport
to speak on behalf of the United States.").
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still at war because international law generally recognizes the Presi-
dent as head of state and the nation's spokesman.'
This role as the nation's spokesman puts the President in a posi-
tion to affect the existence of a state of war under international law.
Since terminating the state of war is important under both domestic
and international law, a method that ends both states of war should be
preferable to one whose effect on international law is uncertain. A
presidential proclamation is superior to a congressional resolution for
this purpose.
Making a definitive statement of the United States's position to
the rest of the world is even more important in the War on Terrorism
than in previous wars. In traditional wars, the position of one nation
can often be inferred from statements or actions of other nations in-
volved in the war. The lack of an enemy with a voice in the interna-
tional community puts the United States in the position of being the
lone source for determining the status of the War on Terrorism.
C. Institutional Advantages
In order to determine whether either Congress or the President
should possess the power to terminate war unilaterally, it is instructive
to examine each branch's comparative advantages. An important insti-
tutional advantage of the President arises from the Constitution's
vesting of the executive power in a single person. Alexander Hamil-
ton, in Federalist 70, recognized this advantage and wrote: "Decision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceed-
ings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceed-
ings of any greater number.' ' . These advantages are particularly im-
portant during war, which makes the Framers' choice of the President
to act as Commander-in-Chief a good one. "' As Professor John Yoo
has pointed out, "The centralization of authority in the President is
particularly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign
policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy
choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that
is far superior to any other branch."''
By controlling military operations as Commander-in-Chief, the
President gains access to better information about the conduct of the
137 See Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds, 1 Oppenheim's International Law
§ 446 at 1034 (Longman 9th ed 1992) ("The Head of a State is competent in international law to
act for his state in its international intercourse .... This competence ... [includes] conclusion of
treaties, declaration of war, and conclusion of peace.").
138 Federalist 70 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist 471,472 (Wesleyan 1961).
13) US Const Art 11, § 2, cl I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States .... ).
140 Yoo, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1676 (cited in note 8).
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war than Congress does. Because the President is better informed
about the conduct of the war, he is in a better position to determine
whether it should end. This advantage was not discussed at the Con-
vention, but was recognized during the debate over the Jay Treaty in
an early Congress. Representative Holland of North Carolina argued:
[The President] is declared Commander-In-Chief of all the Ar-
mies, his situation enabled him to be the best judge of the forces
and of the force he had to contend with, and as secrecy was nec-
essary to effecting a Treaty of Peace, that power was properly
vested in him, guarded by two-thirds of the Senate.4'
The President's access to information has never been as signifi-
cant an advantage as it is in the War on Terrorism. Because highly sen-
sitive intelligence reports are required to determine the location, and
even the existence, of the enemy, the President is in a superior position
to determine whether the war should be terminated. Of course, the in-
telligence information could be shared with Congress to reduce the
President's information advantage. And, in practice, the President will
often share confidential information with select members of Congress.
However, Congress is not designed to be a body to which the nation's
secrets are entrusted. Dissemination of confidential intelligence re-
ports would increase the chance that the information would be ob-
tained by the nation's enemies, and few of the advantages possessed
by a deliberative body could be realized, since the information could
not be openly discussed.
Withholding the power to declare peace from Congress changes
its war-making powers in ways that play to its institutional advantages.
Congress's primary institutional advantage lies in its ability to produce
decisions by a deliberative body composed of divergent viewpoints
and interests. The greater the importance of Congress's decision to de-
clare war or authorize the use of force, the more deliberation that can
be expected and the less likely that Congress will rush into war. '42 A
Congress, knowing that it cannot end the state of war without the
President's agreement, can be expected to deliberate more thoroughly
when deciding whether to declare war. As George Mason desired, this
outcome "clog[s], rather than facilitat[es] war. ' .. Thus, empowering
the President, and not Congress, to declare peace unilaterally plays to
the strengths of both institutions.
141 5 Annals of Cong 546-47 (March 14, 1796) (Gales and Seaton 1849).
142 See Sidak, 41 Duke L J at 89 (cited in note 115). See also note 115 and accompanying
text.
143 See Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention at 548 (cited in note 23).
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D. Congressional Checks
If Congress could not otherwise effectively check the President's
war-making power, recognizing a congressional power to declare
peace might be reasonable. However, Congress's power to declare war
and appropriate money provide sufficient checks. The Declare War
Clause provides an important check: Not only does it give Congress
the power to initiate war, but it also gives Congress the power to limit
the scope of the war."
Congress exercised its power to limit the scope of war when it au-
thorized the use of force in the War on Terrorism. Congress limited
the scope of the war to "those nations, organizations, or persons [that
the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.'... Congress
also stated its purpose for authorizing force: "to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such na-
tions, organizations or persons.'.' While this authorization is broad, it
is undoubtedly narrower than a declaration simply stating that the
United States is at war.
Once force has been authorized, Congress still has a significant
check on the President through its appropriations power. The strength
of the appropriations power is apparent from Congress's role in bring-
ing the military operations in Vietnam to an end. In June 1973, Con-
gress passed a general appropriations bill to which it attached an
amendment that "simply cut off the bombing in Cambodia.' ' .7 Presi-
dent Nixon vetoed the bill and the House failed to override the veto.4
Following a conference between Senator Fulbright and White House
officials,'49 a modified amendment was proposed by Fulbright which
stated that "on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein, heretofore or
hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the
involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or
from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cam-
bodia.". The revised amendment was passed and this time signed by
President Nixon, who, pursuant to the amendment, terminated bomb-
ing on August 14, 1973. ' Although the President's veto power pre-
vented Congress from immediately withdrawing funding, the appro-
144 See text accompanying notes 95-98.
145 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 115 Stat at 224.
146 Id.
147 Ely, War and Responsibility at 39 (cited in note 16).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Fulbright Amendment to H J Res 636, 93d Cong, 1st Sess, in 119 Cong Rec S 22,305
(June 29,1973).
'5' See Ely. War and Responsibility at 41 (cited in note 16).
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priations power gave Congress enough leverage to convince Nixon to
agree to stop bombing the following month. Thus, the appropriations
power provided a check on the President, just as the Framers had en-
visioned.
The appropriations power can provide a check on the President's
authority to wage war in the War on Terrorism. As Professor Yoo has
noted, "In the war against the al Qaeda terrorist organization and the
Taliban militia in Afghanistan, ... President George W. Bush sought
additional funding for military operations, giving Congress the oppor-
tunity to oppose hostilities.... Congress could have effectively
blocked the conduct of hostilities by refusing to appropriate the
funds."' ,2 Congress has not attempted to block funding for the War on
Terrorism, and thus it is difficult to argue that Congress should have
the power to declare peace unilaterally because its traditional checks
on the President are insufficient. Because the powers to declare war
and appropriate funding still provide Congress with checks on the
President's war-making ability, there is no reason to reject the Presi-
dent's role in the peace process.
CONCLUSION
The Framers' original understanding and the early case law rec-
ognize the ratification of a peace treaty as the method for ending the
state of war under domestic law. The restoration of peace with Ger-
many following World War II implies that joint congressional-
executive action can also terminate the state of war. The Hamilton
Court, at the end of the Civil War, concluded that the state of war
could also be terminated by a proclamation of peace. Hamilton recog-
nizes the power of the President to declare peace unilaterally, since
proclamations of peace are traditionally issued by the President.
The circumstances surrounding the War on Terrorism do not war-
rant rejecting the Constitution's original understanding or existing
Supreme Court precedent. While numerous arguments have been ad-
vanced for a congressional power to declare peace, none is sufficiently
compelling to depart from the Hamilton Court's statement of the
methods for terminating war. A peace treaty and presidential procla-
mation, as well as joint congressional-executive action, all require the
President's agreement. As a result, contrary to the widely held view,
Congress cannot unilaterally declare peace by passing a peace resolu-
tion over a presidential veto.
152 Yoo, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1680 (cited in note 8).
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